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Strategic Social Choice

Stable Representations of Constitutions

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154pages
Temps de lecture
6heures

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Focusing on the theoretical frameworks of constitutions and decision-making, this work explores various models, including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Nash equilibrium representations. It delves into the relationship between constitutions and effectivity functions, offering insights on game forms and their implications in political theory. The text presents a detailed analysis of Nash consistent representations and their relevance to liberalism and Pareto optimality. With contributions from notable scholars, it serves as a comprehensive resource for understanding these complex concepts.

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Strategic Social Choice, Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters

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Année de publication
2010
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