Bezalel Peleg Livres

Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games systematically studies the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution a separate chapter is devoted, in which its properties are investigated in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. Separate chapters cover continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. This study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Except for the Shapley value such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in the existing literature on game theory. This book is of interest to Game Theorists, Economists, Mathematicians and Researchers in Operations Research, Political Science and Social Science.

The book offers a comprehensive and rigorous theoretical analysis of voting mechanisms within committees. It delves into the complexities of decision-making processes, examining how different voting systems can influence outcomes and group dynamics. Through detailed exploration, it aims to provide insights into the effectiveness and fairness of various voting strategies in collective settings.

Focusing on the modeling of constitutions through effectivity functions, this monograph is a pioneering work in the field of strategic social choice. It explores social choice functions that support strong Nash equilibrium, making it a valuable resource for researchers and students. The book delves into the theoretical framework and implications of these concepts, offering insights into the intersection of game theory and social choice theory.