Roland Strausz

1. leden 1970

On incentives and asymmetric information in organizations

Épuisé

Roland Strausz On incentives and asymmetric information in organizations

Moral hazard in sequential teams

Épuisé

Roland Strausz Moral hazard in sequential teams

Regulation in a political economy

Épuisé

Roland Strausz Regulation in a political economy

Mitigating non-contractable actions by randomness

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Roland Strausz Mitigating non-contractable actions by randomness

Getting to know your agent

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Roland Strausz Getting to know your agent

Timing of verification procedures

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Roland Strausz Timing of verification procedures

Burried in paperwork

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Roland Strausz Burried in paperwork

Managers and the limited commitment of ordinayry shares

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Roland Strausz Managers and the limited commitment of ordinayry shares

Honest certification and the threat of capture

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Roland Strausz Honest certification and the threat of capture

Regulating availability in bargain sales

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Roland Strausz Regulating availability in bargain sales

Deterministic mechanisms are optimal in standard principal agent models

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Roland Strausz Deterministic mechanisms are optimal in standard principal agent models