Annette Schaper Livres

Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. With regard to non-proliferation, HEU has many disadvantages in comparison to plutonium: It is more easily diverted, smuggled and hidden, and a nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed more simply. Hence, it is desirable to replace all uses of HEU with other materials and to cease all HEU production. Various projects have already produced promising results which indicate this ambition could be achieved. But in order to make further progress, international consensus and commitment are indispensable. The international community and the Federal Republic of Germany would be well advised to push much harder for a ban on HEU production, including for naval fuel.

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FM(C)T) shall limit or reduce the quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Conference of Disarmament was expected to negotiate this treaty but it has been deadlocked since 1996. As all of its decisions are made by consensus, it has been impossible to kick off the negotiations. In this report, Annette Schaper describes the significance of an FM(C)T, its most important elements and the major areas of contention. She concludes with deliberations on the prospects of progress and suggestions of how to get out of the impasse.

This PRIF Report is about the Principles of the verification for a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

Auf dem Weg zur völligen nuklearen Abrüstung stellt die Übergangsphase eine besondere Herausforderung dar. Große Mengen an freiwerdendem waffentauglichem hochangereichertem Uran und Plutonium müssen technisch abgerüstet und irreversibel internationalen Safeguards unterstellt werden. Annette Schaper setzt sich mit den Problemen, die von Skeptikern und Abrüstungsgegnern gegen die Verifikation von Kernmaterial aufgeführt werden, gründlich auseinander und skizziert Lösungsansätze.