Manuel Bremer Livres

This book is conceived as an introductory text into the theory of syntactic and semantic information, and information flow. Syntactic information theory is concerned with the information contained in the very fact that some signal has a non-random structure. Semantic information theory is concerned with the meaning or information content of messages and the like. The theory of information flow is concerned with deriving some piece of information from another. The main part will take us to situation semantics as a foundation of modern approaches in information theory. We give a brief overview of the background theory and then explain the concepts of information, information architecture and information flow from that perspective.

The series delves into theoretical issues in linguistics that intersect with traditional philosophical questions. Topics explored include the foundations of linguistics as a science, various syntactic theories, and theoretical inquiries in semantics, pragmatics, and phonetics.

The book discusses the fate of universality and a universal set in several set theories. The book aims at a philosophical study of ontological and conceptual questions around set theory. Set theories are ontologies. They posit sets and claim that these exhibit the essential properties laid down in the set theoretical axioms. Collecting these postulated entities quantified over poses the problem of universality. Is the collection of the set theoretical entities itself a set theoretical entity? What does it mean if it is, and what does it mean if it is not? To answer these questions involves developing a theory of the universal set. We have to ask: Are there different aspects to universality in set theory, which stand in conflict to each other? May inconsistency be the price to pay to circumvent ineffability? And most importantly: How far can axiomatic ontology take us out of the problems around universality?

This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics - that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed.

The book explores how concepts are studied in philosophy, their methodological role, and the viability of various analytical methods, including conceptual analysis. It engages with contemporary discussions in 'metaphilosophy' and presents bold theses supporting a representationalist theory of meaning and concepts, diverging from traditional ordinary language philosophy. While acknowledging critiques from both philosophy and cognitive sciences, it defends the relevance of conceptual analysis in philosophical inquiry. The text reflects on Frege's influential theory of concepts, which played a significant role in the development of analytic philosophy. It examines Frege's theory of sentential unity and the ongoing challenges stemming from his understanding of concepts, particularly issues highlighted by Russell's Paradox. This leads to a discussion on the nature of logic and the implications for psychological and ontological realism in logic and mathematics. The central section reevaluates ordinary language philosophy and its interpretation of conceptual analysis, asserting that while it cannot encompass all of analytic philosophy, a nuanced understanding of conceptual analysis is essential. The discussion begins broadly with ordinary language philosophy, then transitions into a methodological overview, engaging with epistemological topics through the lens of ordinary language philosophy.

Conceptual atomism claims that most concepts cannot be decomposed into features, so that the conjunction of the features is equivalent to the concept in question. Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism. Justificationist semantics in its pure form, therefore, has to be wrong. Nevertheless, its epistemological approach to questions of evaluations and semantic rules could still stand. The main question is how conceptual atomism can be combined with some justificationist ideas. This new synthesis centres on the representational theory of mind and ‘internalist’ semantics, but ties these to ideas which stress the epistemic commitments that accompany successful assertions.

Das vorliegende Buch behandelt die Problemgeschichte von ‚Vernunft’ und ‚Verstand’ in der Analytischen Philosophie. Insofern trägt es zu deren beginnender Problemgeschichtsschreibung bei. Systematisch wird diese Geschichte als Geschichte der Kritik und Ersetzung der traditionellen Begriffe entwickelt. Die Kritik verläuft als Ersetzung der bewusstseinsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Theorien von ‚Vernunft’ und ‚Verstand’ und deren Leistungen durch eine sprachphilosophische. Beim Ersatzbegriff ‚Rationalität’ zeigt sich, dass die traditionelle Unterscheidung zwischen einem Struktur- und einem Vollzugsaspekt von Vernunft und Verstand wieder auftritt. Dort werden auch Tendenzen zur Elimination oder Naturalisierung der traditionellen Begriffe erörtert.

Was ist Philosophische Semantik? Bedarf es neben der Linguistik überhaupt noch einer „philosophischen“ Semantik? Welche Rolle spielt diese Semantik für die Philosophie im Allgemeinen? Welche methodische Rolle spielt die Klärung von „Bedeutung“ für die Sprachanalytische Philosophie? Tritt die philosophische Semantik an die Stelle der Erkenntnistheorie? In welchem Verhältnis steht sie zur Ontologie und zur Philosophie des Geistes? Diesen Fragen geht das vorliegende Buch nach. In einem zentralen Verständnis von Philosophischer Semantik ist das Wesentliche die Beziehung zwischen Bedeutungstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie (vermittels der Rechtfertigung von Satzverwendungen). Eine so verstandene Semantik hat z. T. einen eigenen Ansatz, der einen zentralen Stellenwert für eine Philosophie in der Analytischen Tradition besitzt. Man kann diese Philosophische Semantik als eine „Erste Philosophie“ ansehen.