Hans Gersbach Livres

This monograph studies multi-member households or, more generally, socio-economic groups from a purely theoretical perspective and within a general equilibrium framework, in contrast to a sizeable empirical literature. The approach is based on the belief that households, their composition, decisions and behavior within a competitive market economy deserve thorough examination. The authors set out to link the formation, composition, decision-making, and stability of households. They develop general equilibrium models of pure exchange economies in which households can have several, typically heterogeneous members and act as collective decision-making units on the one hand and as competitive market participants on the other hand. Moreover, the more advanced models combine traditional exchange (markets for commodities) and matching (markets for people or partners) and develop implications for welfare, social structures, and economic policy. In the field of family economics, Hans Haller and Hans Gersbach have pioneered a 'market' approach that applies the tools of general equilibrium theory to the analysis of household behavior. This very interesting book presents an overview of their methods and results. This is an inspiring work. Pierre-André Chiappori , Columbia University, USA The sophisticated, insightful and challenging analysis presented in this book extends the theory of the multi-person household along an important but relatively neglected dimension, that of general equilibrium theory. It also challenges GE theorists themselves to follow Paul Samuelson in taking seriously the real attributes of that fundamental building block, the household, as a social group whose decisions may not satisfy the standard axioms of individual choice. This synthesis and extension of their earlier work by Gersbach and H aller will prove to be a seminal contribution in its field. Ray Rees, LMU Munich, Germany

Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision for optimal democracies and introduces new rules to help achieve them. Building on the author's previous work, it argues that while liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance, they often fail to inspire enthusiasm and can struggle with efficiency and wealth distribution. Many citizens take democracy for granted, having never experienced an alternative. The author asserts that the potential of democracies remains untapped, and that optimal democracies could serve as both a societal Utopia and a goal for scholars. The book proposes insightful rules to enhance democratic functioning, addressing the challenge of political short-termism. It explores radical yet relevant proposals, including long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets for election outcomes, minority voting, and initiative group constitutions, all grounded in economic analysis. This thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice, and mechanism design uncovers the positive effects of political contracts and new rules for agenda setting. It is a timely exploration of how to improve electoral systems for societal benefit, making it essential reading for anyone concerned about the state of democracies and seeking constructive reforms.

While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ­ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im­ prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina­ tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma­ jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.