Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Livres

Two renowned political scientists show how the rules of politics almost always favor leaders who ignore the national interest and focus on serving their own supporters.

"This is an intro-level text that teaches how to think clearly and conceptually about quantitative information, emphasizing ideas over technicality and assuming no prior exposure to data analysis, statistics, or quantitative methods. The books four parts present the foundation for quantiative reasoning: correlation and causation; statistical relationships; causal phenomena; and incorporating quantitative information into decision making. Within these parts it covers the array of tools used by social scientists, including regression, inference, experiments, research design, and more, all by explaining the rationale and logic behind such tools rather than focusing only on the technical calculations used for each. New concepts are presented simply, with the help of copious examples, and the books leans towards graphic rather than mathematical representation of data, with any technical material included in appendices"--

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

Lucid and compelling, this is an essential guide to the turbulent future of Hong Kong. The authors begin with a concise historical overview, tracing how Hong Kong with its unique geographical setting, "textbook" freemarket economy, and industrious population, developed into one of the world's richest territories. Based on their own expertise in policy choices and a collection of data from a wide range of expert observers, the authors applied a scientific model of decision making to Hong Kong's unknown future.

The fifth edition by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita offers a refined exploration of international relations, emphasizing the strategic factors behind war, peace, and world order. Drawing on extensive feedback, this edition enhances clarity and precision, making complex concepts more accessible. The author’s scientific approach continues to set a benchmark in the field, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics that shape global interactions.

"This book solves one of the great puzzles of history: why did the West become the most powerful civilization in the world? Political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita explains the consolidation of power in the West through a single, little noticed event: the 1132 Concordat of Worms. Bueno de Mesquita makes a deeply researched and persuasive case that the Concordat changed the terms of competition between churches and nation-states, incentivizing economic growth and benefiting citizens over kings and popes. In the centuries since, those countries that have had similar arrangements have been consistently better off than those that did not"-- Provided by publisher

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita can predict the future. Using Game Theory (a theory based on the rationale that everyone acts in their own self-interest) he can foretell and even engineer events.

Focusing on the dynamics of behavior within coalitions, this book offers a theoretical framework that is specifically applied to the context of Indian political party coalitions. It explores how various factors influence the interactions and strategies of political groups, providing insights into the complexities of coalition politics in India.