The book explores the intersection of philosophy of action and law, highlighting how individuals are often penalized for attempts rather than completed crimes. Yaffe provides a clear analysis of the concept of "trying" and its implications for legal adjudication, aiming to clarify the complexities courts encounter in cases of attempted offenses. This work promises to enhance understanding of legal principles related to intent and action, offering a fresh perspective on criminal responsibility.
Focusing on Thomas Reid's philosophical contributions, this work critically analyzes his views on human power, agency, and the will. Despite being a significant 18th-century thinker, Reid's ideas have been under-explored. Gideon Yaffe reconstructs and discusses previously overlooked arguments, revealing the depth behind Reid's straightforward writing. This examination is beneficial for those engaged in contemporary discussions on action and free will, as well as for historians studying philosophical thought.
Gideon Yaffe presents a groundbreaking interpretation of John Locke's perspective on free will and human agency, challenging the common belief that Locke merely equates freedom with the dependency of conduct on our wills. Yaffe argues that for Locke, true free agency encompasses not only self-expression but also the ability to transcend oneself and act according to moral values. This view positions Locke's ideal agent as one who exercises liberty through choices aligned with "the good," reflecting a tradition that sees freedom as an imitation of divine agency.
Gideon Yaffe presents a theory of criminal responsibility according to which child criminals deserve leniency not because of their psychological, behavioural, or neural immaturity but because they are denied the vote. He argues that full shares of criminal punishment are deserved only by those who have a full share of say over the law.