Since the late 1970s, military literature in English and German has focused on the Wehrmacht's command system, particularly Auftragstaktik. Numerous descriptions and historical analyses exist, often comparing it unfavorably with British and American methods before their adoption of Mission Command in the late 1980s. However, few have examined these command approaches through the lens of friction, a fundamental aspect of warfare, leading to a flawed understanding of military operations. This book aims to fill that gap by first exploring the nature of friction and potential command responses, developing a typology of eight command approaches, and assessing their effectiveness and success requirements. It then analyzes the doctrines of the British and German armies to highlight similarities and differences in their views on warfare and responses. The experiences of Erwin Rommel, from his early combat in 1917 to his role as a divisional commander in 1940, are used to illustrate the practical application of German doctrine. Finally, case studies of the armored battles of Amiens in August 1918 and Arras in May 1940 are examined to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each command approach. This work deepens the understanding of command in relation to friction and identifies the necessary conditions for success, serving as a sequel to earlier research on command, training, and tactics in the British and German armies.
