This book addresses contemporary issues in national fiscal policy frameworks, offering new insights. It examines the role of domestic numerical fiscal rules, focusing on their design characteristics and the associated social and economic factors, particularly in relation to the development of the European Union's fiscal regulatory frameworks. The key conclusions are as follows: First, national fiscal rules positively influence fiscal behavior, especially within a common currency regime. Second, certain combinations of fiscal rules yield a stronger positive impact on the cyclically adjusted primary balances of EMU countries. The European Commission's suggestion that "expenditure rules should be better combined with balanced budget and/or revenue rules" is refined to emphasize that these rules should specifically combine with balanced budget and revenue rules. It is demonstrated that "revenue rules" play a crucial role in the domestic fiscal framework's overall effect, potentially reversing its direction when combined with expenditure and balanced budget rules. Third, empirical evidence is presented regarding the significance of the time horizon of fiscal rules within the domestic context. These points propose an alternative to the current form of the Fiscal Compact. Finally, the book outlines ideas for future research and addresses some limitations.
