Gabriela Rossi Livres

The papers in this collection examine the relationship between nature and practical normativity in Antiquity, spanning from the Presocratic period to Neoplatonism. While the presence of contemporary naturalism in Ancient Philosophy is debated, the historical question remains whether this characteristic is common across all ancient ethics. The following pages present a range of interpretations that analyze how, to what extent, and with what success the appeal to nature serves as a strategy for establishing practical normativity in Ancient Philosophy. This exploration provides diverse analyses and diagnoses regarding the role of nature in ethical frameworks, highlighting the complexities and nuances of ancient thought on this subject.

The work presented here delves into Aristotle's theory of chance in Phys. II 4-6, a text found within the discussion about the principles and causes of natural philosophy. Always having this context in view, the author offers an interpretation of the generic definition of chance as a certain kind of accidental causal relation, and shows later how both species of chance distinguished by Aristotle in Phys. II 6 (týche and autómaton) share that common structure. On this reading, it becomes relevant to clarify at the same time the specific mode that this kind of causality adopts in nature and in human agency. Beyond pure exegetical questions, the book considers that the account of chance in Phys. II 4-6 bears philosophical interest, for Aristotle sets out to explain chance taking it as an irreducible phenomenon whose conditions of possibility tries to clarify, rather than taking it as a deceptive appearance which should be eliminated by philosophical reflection. To that extent, Aristotle's account of luck (týche) is shown to be worth considering, even today, as a genuine philosophical alternative to eliminative accounts of this phenomenon.